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Nancy Germano
Spring rains produced “A Flood of Problems,” announced the front 
page of the Kalamazoo Gazette on Saturday, April 19, 1975. The previous 
evening’s four-inch downpour exceeded the city’s total rainfall for the 
entire month of April 1974 (3.59 inches) and April 1973 (3.99 inches). 
The newspaper’s reporters detailed local “problems,” including flooded 
roads, overflowing sewer systems, and flooded basements in homes near 
the sewage treatment plant. Lansing and Flint also experienced heavy rain. 
Flooding and mudslides closed Interstates 75, 96, and 496 and US 
Highway 23. A mudslide on westbound 1-496 in Lansing trapped several 
vehicles, including a fire engine.1 Flooding across the state was described 
as the “worst since 1947.” With expected damage in the millions of 
dollars, Governor William G. Milliken asked President Gerald R. Ford for 
federal disaster aid for fourteen counties.2
While Lansing endured the initial brunt of the 1975 storm emergency, 
Kalamazoo remained in the path of rising waters and suffered subsequent 
damage. Kalamazoo authorities evacuated eighty area families from their 
homes, while others voluntarily abandoned their homes. City crews 
worked round the clock to fill sandbags and pump out basements. 
Kalamazoo Township Supervisor F. E. Griffith told a Gazette reporter 
that the fire department gave top priority to pumping basements for those 
homes that would not fill with water again, explaining that it was not 
practical to pump an entire neighborhood surrounded by a pond of water. 
City health officials warned homeowners to avoid contact with the water 
because of probable pollution from septic systems, to disinfect walls and 
household items, and to throw away all food items except canned goods. 
The Gazette also ran an article featuring warnings by the US Department 
of Housing and Urban Development of the hazards that might await
1 “Kalamazoo All Awash! 4-Inch Rainfall Drenches Area,” Kalamazoo Gazette 
(hereafter KG), 19 April 1975.
2 “Five Area Counties Involved,” KG, 21 April 1975.
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occupants returning to flood-damaged homes, including structural 
damage, gas leaks, and electrical system damage.3
As flooding receded, municipal public works crews and federal 
disaster teams inspected for damage and assessed the costs. President Ford, 
himself from southwestern Michigan, declared his home state a major 
disaster area. Statewide, April’s flooding caused $75 million worth of 
damage.4 In Kalamazoo, Civil Defense Director Walter Jones estimated $1 
million in public costs for township police, fire, patrol, and rescue workers, 
along with damage to private homes and businesses that equaled or 
exceeded that amount.5 Perhaps to reassure traumatized residents with 
long-term perspective, the Gazette ran a follow-up piece— “Flooding a Part 
of Kalamazoo Fhstory”—which showed photographs of past floods and 
lightheartedly noted that “historically, on occasion, life is ‘goo’ in 
Kalamazoo.”6
In this article, Kalamazoo serves as an important case history for 
exploring urban Michigan’s complex relationships with riverine 
landscapes.7 This is not a story of inevitable environmental degradation 
resulting from human settlement patterns and intervention in the natural 
processes of the floodplain.8 Nonetheless, Kalamazoo’s urban flood 
history does represent persistent conflicts between urban land 
development rights and a city’s desire to capitalize on its natural wealth, 
on the one hand, and community and environmental security and 
sustainability on the other. I begin with a biographical examination of the 
city and its river, focusing on how people experienced flooding firsthand.9
3 “It Depends on Rainfall,” KG, 23 April 1975; “Dozen Families Flee Homes,” KG, 
23 April 1975; “It Spells Trouble! Floods Causing Some Problems, Worries, Unusual 
Circumstances,” KG, 23 April 1975; “Enter Flooded Home Carefully,” KG, 24 April 1975.
4 “Kalamazoo to Receive Flood Aid,” KG, 28 April 1975.
3 “Water Level Drops,” KG, 25 April 1975.
6 “Flooding a Part of Kalamazoo History,” KG, 26 April 1975.
7 This article is based in part on the author’s doctoral dissertation, “The Urban 
Midwest’s ‘Dangerous Friends’: At the Confluence of Flooding Rivers, an Environmental 
Movement, and a National Insurance Program” (PhD diss., Indiana University, 2017).
8 See, for example, George P. Marsh, The Earth as Modified by Human Action: A  New 
Edition ojMan and Nature (New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1874);James P. Kemper, 
Rebellious River: Use and Abuse of America’s NaturalResources (Boston, MA: Bruce Humphries, 
Inc., 1949).
91 take the approach of geographers and environmental historians such as John O. 
Anfinson, The River We Have Wrought: A  History of the Upper Mississippi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Mark Cioc, The Rhine: A n  Eco-biogmphy, 1815-2000 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); and Grace Karskens, “Floods and Flood- 
mindedness in Early Colonial Australia,” Environmental History 21 (2016): 315-342.
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Next, I explore how local, state, and federal actors intersected to manage 
inconveniendy “abundant” water and to conquer problem flooding, as a 
particularly Midwestern problem.10 This necessarily involves intersections 
between problem-solving and politics.* 11 Finally, I examine the economics 
of environmentalism in the context of urban water management. I pay 
special attention to flood insurance as a critical mechanism for negotiating 
the political and legal quagmires of public interests and private rights.12
In the twenty-first century, Michigan cities continue to battle extreme 
and locally-catastrophic flood events. From this struggle emerges a 
reasonable question: At what point should flood disasters be approached 
as unnatural and avoidable events, rather than “natural” and 
“unavoidable” (as in, “on occasion, life is ‘goo’”)?
A Biography of the Kalamazoo River Basin
In the Michigan Territory of the late 1820s, Euro-American settlers 
began arriving at the future site of Kalamazoo County. Settlers discovered 
fertile prairie land, rolling hills, and fresh-water rivers, creeks, and lakes. 
These were legacies of Pleistocene Epoch glaciers. When the glaciers’ 
Lake Michigan Lobe paused during its northwesterly recession, it released 
large quantities of till, forming the Kalamazoo moraine. While the lobe 
remained stable, melting ice transported outwash away from the moraine, 
creating an outwash plain. Simultaneously, the Saginaw Lobe retreated in 
a northeasterly direction, forming the Tekonsha moraine in the eastern 
part of the county and creating another outwash plain. The glaciers’
10 Lynne Heasley and Daniel Macfarlane, “Introduction,” in Border Flows: A  Century 
o f the Canadian-American Water Relationship, eds. Heasley and Macfarlane (Calgary, Alberta: 
University of Calgary Press, 2016), 8; David B. Walker, “The Nature and Systemic Impact 
of ‘Creative Federalism,’” in The Great Society and Its Legag: Twenty Years o fU .S . Social Polig, 
eds. Marshall Kaplan and Peggy Cuciti (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 197- 
199,207.
11 Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel o fE jfc ieng : The Progressive Conservation 
Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959); John McPhee, 
The Control o f Nature (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1989); Karen M. O’Neill, Rivers by 
Design: State Power and the Origins o fU .S. Flood Control (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2006); Rutherford H. Platt, F and Use and Sociey: Geography, I m w , and Public Polig, rev. ed. 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2004).
12 Ari Kelman, A  River and Its City: The Nature o f Landscape in N ew  Orleans (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003); David Welky, The Thousand-Year Flood: The Ohio- 
Mississippi Disaster o f 1937 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Donald Worster, 
Rivers o f Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth o f the American West (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985).
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periods of retreat, re-advance, and stability left the county with morainic 
ridges, outwash plains, lakes, streams, and poorly drained bogs and ponds.13
The Kalamazoo River Valley likely formed when runoff to the river 
eroded the valley to a depth of more than 150 feet “below the adjacent 
hills of the moraine and outwash plain,” with a floodplain floor more than 
one mile wide in places.14 The Kalamazoo River system drains 
approximately 2,000 square miles in ten counties in southwest Michigan. 
Its north branch heads in lakes in Jackson County, and the south branch 
arises from marshland in Hillsdale County, with the two branches joining
13 Lloyd J. Schmaltz, “Surficial Geology,” in Kalamazoo County: Geology and the 
,Environment, ed. Richard N. Passero, et al. (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 
1978), 17.
^  Ibid., 22.
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at Albion. From there, the river’s main stem continues its northwesterly 
path to Lake Michigan, with the mouth located near the towns of Douglas 
and Saugatuck. It enters Kalamazoo County at the northeast corner and 
flows southwesterly until taking a northern turn at Kalamazoo and exiting 
the county on a northerly path. The river system drains approximately 
56% of Kalamazoo County (the northern portion). The St. Joseph River 
system drains 43% of the county (the southern portion), and the Paw Paw 
River System drains the remaining 1%.15
The city’s founder, Titus Bronson, built his claim shanty in the 
floodplain on the west side of the river in the summer of 1829. By 1836, 
the fast-growing village faced its first flooding problems, when high water 
covered the road near the Main Street bridge. In May 1858, the 
Kalamazoo River again flooded the Main Street bridge, and its Portage 
Creek and Arcadia Creek tributaries flooded their banks. A large portion 
of the village flooded, with Whitcomb’s Mill and Distillery incurring 
especially heavy damage. Floods followed in 1854, 1864, 1868,1869, and 
1887.16
Despite flood risks, Kalamazoo industries continued to expand 
within the floodplain of the river and its tributaries. Most famous today 
are the Dutch immigrants, who arrived as early as 1850. They introduced 
a strain of celery seeds that later earned Kalamazoo its national reputation 
as the “Celery City.” Celery requires rich soil with constant moisture to 
grow, and the area’s p lentiful “m uckland” provided those m oist
15 William B. Harrison, “Surface Water,” in Kalamazoo County, 45; Michigan Department 
of Natural Resources, Fisheries Division, Lower Kalamazoo River Natural River Plan, rev. 12 
March 2002 (Lansing: Michigan Department of Namral Resources, July 1981), 2-6, 
michigan.gov/documents/Lower_Kalamazoo_River_Plan_2301 l_7.pdf (accessed 15 
March 2017).
16 Willis F. Dunbar, Kalamazoo and How it Grew. .. and Grew. . .  (Kalamazoo: Western 
Michigan University, 1969), 2-5, 23-26, 32-37; Samuel W. Durant, History of Kalamazoo 
County, Michigan: with illustrations and biographical sketches of its prominent men and pioneers 
(Philadelphia, PA: Everts & Abbott, 1880), 208-213, 217, 219, 220, 223, 263; Susan E. 
Gray, “Land Speculator as Confidence Man: Mumford Eldred, Jr., and the Michigan Land 
Rush,” journal of the Early Republic 10, no. 3 (Autumn 1990): 387-388; Michigan Water 
Resources Commission, Flood Conditions in the Kalamazoo Area (Lansing: Michigan Water 
Resources Commission, July 1957), 1. Bronson is described as generous and scrupulously 
honest, but an eccentric man who offended others. Historians surmise that the name 
change was an effort to disassociate the town from the man. In addition to the village 
name change, on January 23, 1837, the village newspaper owner changed the name of the 
Michigan Statesman to Kalamazoo Gazette. First published on October 2, 1835, it is the oldest 
newspaper in the state outside of Detroit.
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A postcard showing one of Kalamazoo’s many celery fields, c. 1911
Source: Kalamazoo Public Library Historical Photographs, Flickr Commons
conditions. By the end of the century, Kalamazoo had approximately 
4,000 acres in celery culdvation and around 400 farms employed 3,500 
workers.17
The still-larger pulp and paper industry also capitalized on 
Kalamazoo River water. Paper-making required an abundant water 
supply, a power source like hydro-electricity, and a means to carry away 
waste, such as a river current. Early paper production used straw from 
nearby wheat and rye fields, but later production depended upon the 
area’s hardwood forests. By the turn of the century, paper mills lined the 
banks of the river and its tributaries.18
The village itself needed a coordinated water system to fight fires, for 
household use, and for sewage drainage. Public and private drains handled
17 Dunbar, Kalamazoo, 47-48, 61-63, 99-100; Durant, History of Kalamazoo County, 225, 
230; John T. Houdek and Charles F. Heller, Jr., “The Emergence of Prosperous Farmers 
and Businessmen in Nineteenth-Century Kalamazoo County, Michigan,” Michigan 
Historical Review 37, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 56-58; John A. Jakle and James O. Wheeler, “The 
Changing Residential Structure of the Dutch Population in Kalamazoo, Michigan,” Annals 
of the Association of American Geographers 59, no. 3 (September 1969): 446-447.
18 Dunbar, Kalamayoo, 89-91; Durant, History of Kalamazoo County, 256; Larry B. Massie 
and Peter J. Schmitt, Kalamazoo: The Place Behind the Products, sponsored by Kalamazoo 
Chamber o f Commerce (Windsor Publications, 1981), 121-124,149-150.
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Riverside Foundry during a Kalamazoo River flood, c. 1900
Source: Kalamazoo Valley Museum Photograph File and Kalamazoo Public Library
Kalamazoo’s sewage, emptying into area waterways. Sewage disposal was 
such an essential service that, in 1881, Kalamazoo trustees amended the 
village charter to provide for a board of sewerage commissioners and a 
more coordinated program for ensuring public health. The board had a 
trunk line constructed on Vine Street, and lateral lines were constructed 
on other downtown streets. The new sewer system emptied directly into 
the Kalamazoo River.19
By 1884, Kalamazoo’s population reached approximately 16,000 
(when it incorporated as a city). By 1900, the city’s population had 
increased to 24,404. At that point, city officials began to keep records of 
flood stages. Just four years later, Kalamazoo experienced its most 
destructive flood. The “great flood” of March 1904 covered nearly two 
square miles of the city, closed factories, handicapped transportation, and 
caused upwards of $50,000 in damages, including the lost wages of factory 
workers. The front page of the March 26, 1904, Gazette announced the 
arrival of the “Worst Flood Ever Known in History of City.”20 The east 
side was under water; there were floods on the south side, deserted 
homes, floating animals, and washed-out roads and railroad tracks. Sewer 
lines emptying into the river raised concerns about public health dangers
19 Dunbar, Kalamazoo, 93-94; Durant, History of Kalamazoo County, 259, 268-269.
20 “Kalamazoo Valley Raging Flood,” KG, 26 March 1904.
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Flooded homes in the East Vine Street area of Kalamazoo, March 27,1904
Source: Kalamazoo Public library History Room Photograph File
from the flood water. The flood of 1904 provided the city with a baseline 
comparison for floods to follow in 1908 and 1918.21
This continuous and often-destructive flood pattern became well 
known but did not prevent mostly unchecked urban growth. By the mid­
twentieth century, Kalamazoo’s built environment and related urban 
infrastructure had consumed the river’s floodplain. Kalamazooans 
developed all available water resources—mucklands, rivers, and creeks. 
Simultaneously, though, city, state, and federal officials did apply expertise 
and management techniques to mitigate flooding. They also attempted to 
reconcile conflicting ideas about local responsibility, state governance, 
and federal assistance. An examination of both governance and specific 
methods reveal flood control efforts that nonetheless went astray. 
Officials and residents lost sight of the biography of the river valley. The
21 Dunbar, Kalamazoo, 86, 103; “Loss Am ounts to $50,000,” KG, 5 April 1904; 
Michigan W ater Resources Commission, Flood Conditions in the Kalamazoo Area, 1 -2.
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The Bryant Paper Company was am ong the Kalamazoo businesses to 
suffer flood damage in 1914.
Source: Western Michigan University Photograph and Kalamazoo Public 1 .ibrary
1975 flood was typical of the ensuing dangers of growth that capitalized 
on but could not fully control a dynamic urban landscape.
Managing the Floodplain’s Risk
b o c a l  Solutions
As Kalamazoo faced twentieth-century urban growing pains, 
managing the floodplain became a priority. After extensive flooding in the 
1930s, city officials applied to the federal Works Progress Administration 
(WPA) for funds to complete a flood-control project. The agency 
approved the project to reclaim approximately seventy acres of land for 
industrial, park, or playground sites along a three-mile stretch of the 
Kalamazoo River. The work also included cleaning the river and creeks, 
“banking up” river walls, removing sandbars and kinks in the river, and 
constructing control basins and reservoirs. The project involved 
development as well: to develop, landscape, and beautify the area with 
parks and boulevards; and to plat new streets with lots “suitable for first 
class dwellings or for business establishments.”22 A further benefit: 
several years of employment for large numbers of men, with the WPA
22 “City Acquires Land in Flood Control Move,” KG, 21 May 1940.
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Map of Kalamazoo Quadrangle, 1918. Managing the river floodplain 
became a priority as the urban area expanded.
Source: US Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, at 
www.oldmapsonline.org/map/usgs/5442852
paying the majority of costs. The Gazette reported that this project would 
be the “largest flood control program ever planned by the city,” and 
Kalamazoo officials fully expected it to place the city on a “virtually ‘high 
and dry’ basis so far as floods are concerned.”23
As work was nearing completion in 1943, City Manager Edward S. 
Clark claimed in a report that the city should recoup the nearly $100,000
23 “Flood Control Project Will Cost $237,820,” KG, 24 O ctober 1939.
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cost by selling choice building lots in the reclaimed area. Clark also 
reminded citizens of why the project had been needed: the land adjacent 
to creeks was lower than the river’s ordinary high-water level (which was 
reached after any heavy rain or sudden winter thaw). Therefore, water 
would back up into the creeks, and hundreds of homes and business 
buildings with floors below the normal river level flooded. To remedy 
this, ponds had been added to the WPA project to function as storage 
basins. Unfortunately, as Clark noted, the ponds would not completely 
replace “the natural flood basins lost when the former swampy areas 
adjacent to the creeks were filled by property owners to provide home or 
building sites,” but once completed, Clark claimed the program would 
make the city “virtually free from serious flood damage.”24
The 1940s brought about new interventions in the Kalamazoo River 
flood regime, some evolving from local circumstances, others linked to 
national events. In 1941, the federal government restricted WPA funds to 
defense projects. Kalamazoo found itself shouldering costs for any future 
remediation, either by issuing debt or with taxes. In addition, the city 
faced a decreasing tax base because its population was decreasing as the 
county’s population was growing. This pattern was indicative of the 
national trend toward suburban annexation at the expense of urban 
centers. The city accumulated a backlog of water-related projects. Having 
relied on pumps for water and septic tanks and cesspools for sewage 
disposal, the city’s postwar suburban communities required modern 
sanitary services to deal with both “the water accumulating in their streets 
and yards whenever it rained” and their overflowing septic tanks and 
cesspools.25 The city itself had a pressing need for a sewage disposal plant. 
As the city struggled to manage its debt, and in the context of inadequate 
infrastructure, residents experienced the 1947 flood.26
The April 1947 flood dispelled optimism that the WPA Kalamazoo 
flood control project would prevent flooding. The river and creeks 
overflowed into neighborhood streets, basements and celery fields 
flooded, county roads and bridges washed out, and area businesses were 
crippled. The Consumers Power Company announced that the river had
24 “Report Made on Highway Park Plans,” KG, 31 January 1943.
25 Dunbar, Kalamazoo, 189.
26 Ibid., 182-195.
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reached its highest level in twenty-five years, while officials estimated 
damages into the millions of dollars.27
Defensive about the system of ponds, sewers, and creeks completed 
just a few years prior, Clark and City Engineer Harold L. Andrus blamed 
the 1947 flood on fast-rising river levels, which, they said, had prevented 
creeks and storm water drains from emptying into the river, thereby 
causing a backup. When the city attorney determined that the city was not 
liable to pay damages for private homeowners, property owners united. A 
coalition of business owners held a public meeting on June 23, 1947, with 
approximately seventy-five people attending. The group organized as the 
Kalamazoo County Flood Control Committee and elected officers and a 
board of directors.28
Under directive from the city commissioners, Clark turned to the 
federal government again, but this time citizens wanted and expected more 
modern expertise to resolve flooding. Clark contacted Michigan’s US 
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, who convinced the Senate that something 
needed to be done. On June 24, 1947, the Senate Committee on Public 
Works adopted a resolution authorizing the US Army Corps of Engineers 
(hereafter Corps) to survey the Kalamazoo River and determine whether 
flood-control improvements were advisable. A public hearing in city hall on 
January 21, 1948, allowed the Corps to hear city officials’ suggestions for 
eliminating causes of flooding and to hear community members’ concerns. 
Clark and Andrus went on record in favor of deepening the river through 
the city and to the east, making further modifications to river hydrography, 
and building low dams on creeks in lowlands and marsh areas. A number 
of property owners, business and industrial representatives, and other 
interested persons testified during the hearing—“most of them favoring 
immediate flood control measures.”29
Thus, Kalamazoo began a long process of seeking “permanent,” 
federally funded flood control— a process that involved flood-control 
studies, recommendations, authorizations, and appropriations, as well as 
efforts to resolve local conflicts between economic and safety concerns.
27 “Rivers, Creeks Go Over Banks,” KG, 6 April 1947; “Damage in City and State 
Will Reach Millions,” KG, 7 April 1947.
2B “Defend Flood Control,” KG, 13 April 1947; “City' Not Liable for Damages Cause 
by Flood, Attorney Rules,” KG, 6 May 1947; “Public Meeting on Floods Called,” KG, 22 
June 1947; “Group Seeking Method to Ban Floods Forms,” KG, 24 June 1947.
29 “War Department Engineers Plan River Survey,” KG, 29 June 1947; US Senate, 
Kalamazoo River, Mich., Kalamagoo and Vicinity, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, S. Doc. 53, v; 
“Federal Flood Control Survey Planned Here,” KG, 8 September 1947; “Warns Future 
Flood May Be City’s Worst,” KG, 21 January 1948.
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The arguments for federal assistance posited that engineering expertise 
and federal dollars would relieve local burdens. Arguments against federal 
involvement emphasized that it would result in long delays, require 
capitulation to federal rules, and increase local spending. Moreover, 
federal legislation was necessary for any proposal involving 
appropriations. As Corps Milwaukee District Engineer Colonel J. O. 
Colonna explained, “even if a federal control project is presented to the 
Kalamazoo ‘community,’ there will be many strings attached,” and he 
candidly estimated that the cost to the community would “amount to 
about half the cost of the project”— Kalamazoo would be “faced with a 
considerable expenditure.”30
Meanwhile, proponents of a local approach to flood control believed 
that keeping the river and creeks clear of trash and debris would reduce 
flooding. City officials allocated “thousands of dollars” each year to 
remove tons of trash that obstructed river and creek flows, as well as 
storm sewer drains. While Clark assured residents that the city would do 
“all it can” to prevent floods, he cautioned that these clean-up efforts 
could only help reduce damages— the city “certainly can’t guarantee the 
people that we won’t have another flood!”31 As in past years, city 
commissioners authorized $4,000 for a cleanup project in February 1948 
in anticipation of the spring thaw.32
Another flood in March 1948 left proponents of federal flood control 
feeling vindicated in their efforts. The Gazette again reported the 
devastation visiting the city and its surrounds from the swollen 
Kalamazoo River and creeks— the 1948 flood crested only one foot 
below the 1947 level.33 The Kalamazoo Flood Control Committee— the 
citizen action group formed following the 1947 flood—petitioned the city 
commission to “fulfill its obligation” to residents and employees in the 
Portage and Axtell Creek areas by removing obstructions, installing 
adequate storm sewers, removing filth from stream beds, and restraining 
industries from upstream dumping. The group’s spokesman and attorney, 
Austin J. Doyle, accused the city of consigning residents and businesses 
in the area “to the status of a slum.” Doyle further claimed that the city
30 “U.S. Engineers Making 2-Year Study of Area,” KG, 22 February 1948.
31 “Prepare Creeks As Precaution Against Floods,” KG, 10 February 1948.
32 “U.S. Engineers.”
33 “Over 17,000 Tons Topsoil Washed Away,” KG, 28 March 1948.
94 The Michigan Historical Review
allowing upstream paper mills to pollute the creek had sacrificed residents 
and businesses for industry.34
Obstruction of surface water sources, however, was only one 
contributor to the city’s flooding problem. As the city suffered a 
particularly rainy spring in 1948, the Gazette highlighted not only the city’s 
drainage challenges but also the effects of manipulating natural systems. 
Again, there was hope for resolution through human ingenuity:
Like many other cities which are situated in river 
valleys, Kalamazoo is confronted with the fact that when 
man upsets Nature’s balance he must devise his own 
means of correcting the imbalance thus caused. 
Translated into less philosophical and more specific 
terms, this means that if we are going to build modern 
cities and let them grow we must do something to offset 
the effects of the resulting interference with natural 
drainage.
We don’t want mosquito-breeding swamps in our
urban communities, so we fill them in__ We don’t want
flooded basements or yards if we can avoid them, so 
when we are building on low ground we try to build a 
little higher than the surrounding area. All these things 
are logical, natural, and sensible, but the fact remains that 
they have their effects on the drainage problem. . . .
The hope is that major improvements in the 
drainage capacity of the Kalamazoo river . . . will 
eventually provide a final and complete correction of 
flood conditions in this community.35
As the article revealed, despite knowledge of the destructive 
consequences of human encroachment on floodplains, those activities 
remained, in their thinking, “logical” and “sensible.” Growth and 
development would continue, and so would the hope that human 
ingenuity could outwit nature. Beyond the ephemeral moment of the 
article was a larger collective tendency to forget about floods later, to seek 
a return to normalcy, and to lose a sense of urgency for costly changes to 
avoid future floods.
34 “More Than 200 Petition for Flood Relief,” KG, 4 May 1948.
35 “Kalamazoo’s Drainage Problem,” KG, 13 May 1948.
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For its part, the Corps of Engineers did not abandon its pursuit of a 
federal flood control program for the Kalamazoo River. Corps District 
Engineer Colonna submitted an initial survey report on July 22,1949. He 
determined that the most practical plan would widen, deepen, and 
straighten the river channel through the city, add a low-flow control dam 
to offset the impact of river modifications on well-water users and 
farmers, and enlarge the lower portion of Portage Creek. The proposed 
improvements, Colonna noted, would “eliminate eighty percent of the 
flood damages in the area” by providing “complete protection against 
damage” from floods up to fifty percent larger than the 1904 flood. Initial 
estimated costs for the project totaled $4,325,000, with the federal share 
determined at $3,975,000. In addition to paying its share of the costs, the 
city’s obligations included furnishing necessary land and easements, 
releasing the federal government from any damages, maintaining and 
operating the project after completion, preventing encroachments, and 
making changes to city utilities necessitated by channel improvements. 
The Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors agreed with Colonna’s 
recommendations, with one additional proviso: before spending any 
federal funds and beginning construction, the city must address pollution 
of the Kalamazoo River from sewer and industrial waste discharges.36
After three years, it seemed that federal assistance might be 
forthcoming. But unforeseen obstacles slowed the momentum. The 
Kalamazoo project was part of a billion-dollar public works bill that 
included other projects nationwide. On August 10, 1956, Michigan’s 
Congressman August E. Johansen delivered the unwelcome news that 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower had vetoed this “pork barrel” bill. 
Eisenhower signed a revised bill in July 1958, but project commencement 
remained years away. First, the Corps had to complete a more detailed 
engineering study; second, federal funding for the project required 
separate legislation; and third, benefiting communities had to appropriate 
their “matching” funds and comply with project prerequisites.37
36 US Senate, S. Doc. 53, 1-6, 31-36, 39-41. The federal Flood Control Act of 1936 
and Flood Control Act of 1944 required “local cooperation” as a condition for federal 
projects that predominandy benefitted local interests.
37 “Make Flood Control Plans Now,” KG, 1 August 1956; “Flood Works Bill Vetoed 
by President,” KG, 10 August 1956; “Ike Kills Kalamazoo River Bill,” KG, 15 April 1958; 
“Ike Backs Sound Water Bill,” KG, 27 April 1958; “Ike Signs Local River Flood Bill,” KG, 
4 July 1958; “Paper Details Come First,” KG, 7 July 1958.
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State and Regional Solutions
As Kalamazooans continued to balance local and federal solutions, 
the State of Michigan weighed in. Historically, state officials had taken an 
active role in managing the state’s water sources: its Great Lakes, its 
36,000 miles of rivers and streams, and its 11,000 inland lakes. While these 
resources established major themes in the state’s history— navigation, 
shipping, commerce, water-based industries, sports, and recreation— 
inland water resources also commanded attention to drainage, pollution, 
and flooding. Indeed, early in Michigan’s state history, its legislature 
adopted laws to address problems with water that threatened the health 
and welfare of citizens.
As early as 1897, Michigan passed a law to provide for construction 
and maintenance of drains and establish a method to pay for the work. 
From that start, state drainage law evolved with amendments made every 
few years, adding procedures for situations when conflicts of interest 
arose, for drainage improvements using mechanical pumps, for permits 
to use county drains for sewage disposal, for establishment of a revolving 
fund for drain construction, and for establishment of county and 
agricultural drainage districts. By 1956, the mounting amendments 
necessitated a reorganization and recodification of the law, which at that 
point not only governed drainage but also, specifically, provided for flood 
control projects.38
In another early foray into state oversight of water matters, legislators 
placed pollution control under the purview of the state Department of 
Conservation, created in 1921. In 1929, the state became one of a few to 
create a Stream Control Commission with the sole purpose of protecting 
the state’s waters from waste disposal by municipalities, industries, public 
or private corporations, individuals, or any other entity.39 Writing in 1946, 
after seventeen years of commission efforts, however, commission chair 
William DeKleine voiced his frustration about the continued level of 
pollution, calling it “far greater today than before the war.” DeKleine’s 
frustration was also directed at the commission’s inability to achieve its 
goal, noting the lack of staffing and funding needed for pollution control 
“on the scale necessary to meet the multitude of problems which 
Michigan’s water resources and their conflicting uses present.” To make
38 Michigan Public A c ts  (hereafter A c ts ) 1897 PA 254; A c ts  1901 PA 27; A c ts  1909 PA 
69; A c ts  1911 PA 208;A c t s  1915 PA 2 % ; A c ts  1921 PA 95 - A c t s  1923 PA 316; A c ts  1929 
PA 158; A c ts  1931 PA 243; A c t s  1932 PA 38; A c ts  1949 PA 247; A c t s  1956 PA 40.
39 A c ts  1921 PA 11; A c ts  1929 PA 245.
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matters worse, the sources of pollution went beyond municipal sewer 
systems and industrial waste disposal—a significant amount of pollution 
originated from state institutions such as hospitals and universities. In his 
opinion, some exceptions were needed to avoid charges of the state 
violating its own laws, which also made the commission’s job of enforcing 
pollution abatement for others more difficult.40
On May 17, 1949, state lawmakers reorganized the commission in an 
attempt to encourage more cooperation. Under the 1949 act, the 
commission’s name was changed to the Water Resources Commission, 
and it added three citizen members: one each from groups representing 
industrial management, municipalities, and conservation associations. In 
addition to the commission’s original responsibility to control pollution, 
the law specifically required that the commission provide advice and 
support for any flood-control and drainage districts. Thus, the new 
commission became the “middle man” between local and federal 
governments for flood control projects. Exercising its new 
responsibilities, the commission met with the Corps in January 1950 in 
connection with Kalamazoo’s pursuit of a federal flood-control project. 
To appease one of the Corps’ reservations about the project, the 
commission declared its intent to “establish as its objective in the 
Kalamazoo area, the cleanup of all pollution detrimental to the proposed 
flood-control project within the next 3- to 5-year period.”41
The commission’s 1950-1952 report to Governor G. Mennen 
Williams and members of the legislature reaffirmed conflicts attendant to 
the state’s “most important natural resource,” noting that water was, at 
times, also “one of the great agents of destruction.” The commission 
reported that “direct damage to property along inland rivers by seasonal 
floods has been estimated at more than $1,500,000 per year in Michigan.” 
Based on experience, the commission expected flood damages to increase 
in the future “under the double threat of continued, unrestricted 
encroachments by permanent building” in floodplains and stream
40 William DeKleine to Andrew W. Fleming, Press Secretary, Executive Office, 
“Stream Control Commission,” August 1946, “Legislative Committee on Stream 
Pollution,” Record 65-51-A, box 1, folder 14, Michigan History Center, Lansing, MI 
(hereafter MHC).
41 Acts 1949 PA 117; Michigan Water Resources Commission, Combined Second and 
Third Annual Reports, 1950-1952 (Lansing: Water Resources Commission, 1952), 16; US 
Senate, S. Doc. 53, x.
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obstruction originating, in part, from industrial waste disposal practices. 
Yet, in 1952, the commission’s regulations had not addressed these 
threats, and the commission and the public still looked to structural 
approaches to correct flooding problems.42
Regional efforts to manage water resources also complicated matters. 
The commission sponsored the ninth Midwestern States Flood Control 
Conference on the campus of Michigan State College in East Lansing in 
June 1954. Representatives from nine Midwestern states attended the 
conference to discuss hydrological and legal aspects of water management. 
Commission chairman and director of conservation Gerald E. Eddy 
presented a paper on the problems of water management in Michigan, 
noting that the abundance of water had presented problems in terms of 
managing the state’s water resources— chiefly, “a persisting public attitude 
of taking water for granted,” which in turn had led to “a lack of public 
understanding of how water resources behave”— citing the example of 
encroachment on floodplains. The “most complex” problem, however, was 
that of stream flow stabilization—managing seasonal river levels would 
require “varied, widespread, and carefully coordinated” efforts.43
Conference attendees also discussed the challenge of keeping the 
public informed of water resource issues. The commission explained its 
goal of presenting “a clear, concise picture” of what had happened in the 
past and what might be expected in the future. Its message held particular 
significance, the commission noted, because “many homes and 
businesses have been built in the flood plain” due to a lack of public 
information. “Floods that have occurred tend to be ‘soon forgotten,”’ it 
warned, and “each new structure added in these damaged areas awaits the 
rise of uncontrolled waters inundating the flood plains.”44 The 
commission’s 1954 report on flood conditions in the state’s capital was 
prompted, in part, by the weather event in 1947, which had caused 
significant damage to property along the Grand and Cedar Rivers in 
Lansing. Unlike Kalamazoo, settlement in Lansing had begun on higher 
land, but as the city grew its lowlands became more valuable for 
commercial, industrial, and residential use. At the time of its report, the 
commission stated that development had continued with nearly all of the
42 Michigan Water Resources Commission, Combined Reports, 15-17,45-46.
43 Gerald E. Eddy, “Basic Problems o f Water Management in Michigan,” in Michigan 
Water Resources Commission, Talks and Papers Presented at Ninth Midwestern States Flood Control 
Conference (Lansing: Michigan Water Resources Commission, 20 January 1955), 15-20.
44 Michigan Water Resources Commission, Flood Conditions in the Fansing Area 
(Lansing: Michigan Water Resources Commission, September 1954), 2.
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floodplains utilized, and, if a flood of the same or greater magnitude as 
the 1904 flood were to occur again in the 1950s, the commission 
esdmated it would cause flood damages in excess of $5 million in 
Lansing.45 With its report, the commission met its goal of presenting 
information to help inform the public and policy makers of flood dangers 
and associated challenges.
The state adopted an intermediary position during the 1950s, and 
state legislators approved laws that enabled local units of government to 
take action. In 1952, the state authorized local governments to acquire 
land and contract with the federal government for flood-control projects 
for the public good. In 1956, legislators approved procedures for local 
governmental units to establish water management districts with the 
authority to undertake drainage and flood-control improvements to 
eliminate problems jeopardizing the health and safety of individuals. In 
1964, lawmakers also authorized two or more local governments to 
collaborate and petition to establish a river management district, which 
would have the power to acquire, construct, operate, and finance water 
storage or other river control facilities. Over the years, the state had 
further enabled local control of land use and flood prevention by 
providing legal authorization to establish local planning commissions and 
zoning laws, as well as granting powers to effect and enforce local goals 
by issuing bonds, assessing taxes, policing through use of ordinances and 
regulations, appropriating and budgeting, and utilizing eminent domain.46
Beginning in the late 1960s, state legislation reflected a more 
authoritative approach to flood control, in keeping with changes occurring 
in Washington, DC. As Congress debated the details of a national flood 
insurance program, Michigan legislators adopted the Subdivision Control 
Act of 1967, mainly directed at alleviating indiscriminate land subdivision 
practices but also requiring state agency reviews when a proposed 
subdivision involved flood-prone areas. In 1968, state lawmakers passed 
the Floodplain Control Act, giving the commission responsibility for 
ensuring stricter controls over alterations and obstructions to watercourses
45 Ibid, 3-4.
^Acts 1952 PA 278; Acts 1956 PA 40; Acts 1964 PA 253; Michigan Department of 
Natural Resources, Division of Land Resource Programs, Floodplain Management and State 
Action in Prevention of Flood Damage (Lansing: Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 
December 1977), 29-32.
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and floodplains. As authorized under that act, the commission issued 
regulations for floodplain control, which prohibited future interference 
with the natural function of floodplains with a drainage area of at least two 
square miles (except in specified circumstances).47
A reorganization and restructuring of agencies charged with 
managing the state’s natural resources occurred in the late 1960s and 
1970s. In 1969, all functions of the Department of Conservation 
transferred to a new Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and the 
Water Resources Commission became a division of the DNR. Declaring 
that, “despite the great effort of conservationists, man still misuses and 
mistreats his environment,” Governor William Milliken created an 
advisory council for environmental quality. Milliken’s order tasked the 
council with investigating and evaluating the effectiveness of 
environmental management programs and making recommendations, 
using available expertise, to advance “the art of environmental quality 
management.” The council’s working priority list was long, but it included 
the need for zoning to protect floodplains and open space in urban areas 
and water management for purposes of flood control. In 1973, Milliken 
designated the DNR as the state entity responsible for developing and 
coordinating all environmental matters.48
Another matter that captured Milliken’s attention was land use— an 
issue that combined environmental issues with economic development. In 
November 1970, Milliken established a special commission on land use to 
consider and recommend possible programs aimed at protecting future 
land use needs. For “the best interests of the public,” the special 
commission identified critical land use areas: urbanizing areas, prime 
agricultural land, recreational land, and unique and natural resource areas. 
The special commission’s report, dated December 1971, referred to the 
rapid growth of urbanized land in southern Michigan—an increase from 
669,000 acres in 1940 to 1,722,000 acres in 1961— and the conflicting 
demands on the limited land resources, which called for action to achieve 
the goal of a “better society.” Believing that state management of land use 
practices was necessary to ensure the future health of the state’s citizens, 
the special commission recommended tax reform to correct existing
41 Acts 1967 PA 288; Acts 1968 PA 167; Michigan Administrative Code 1954 ACS 62, sec. 
323.201, et seq.\ Michigan Department o f Natural Resources, Floodplain Management, 26-28.
48 Acts 1969 PA 208; Michigan Executive Order 1969-1; Michigan Office o f Planning 
Coordination, Bureau o f Policies and Programs, Technical Report J - l l ,  Environmental 
Quality in Michigan (Lansing: Michigan Office of Planning Coordination, February 1970), 
1-4; Michigan Executive Order 1973-2.
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conflicts of interest. The proposed law would correct the state’s “ad-hoc 
approach to establishing priorities.”49 In 1974, the legislature passed one 
component of the special commission’s recommendations— a law aimed at 
preserving valuable agricultural land and open spaces—permitting 
landowners to enter into agreements pledging they would not sell their land 
to developers in exchange for tax benefits. Unfortunately for the 
proponents of an omnibus land use control law, the farmland preservation 
act generated debates. With critics viewing the policies as inappropriate 
government interference in private property decisions and market 
functions, the land use control law never received legislative approval.50
The conflicts surrounding land use and water resources continued, 
despite the state’s efforts. The state’s flooding problems continued as 
well. After the 1975 flood on the Kalamazoo, Grand, Flint, and 
Shiawassee Rivers, legislators approved the Emergency Preparedness 
Act of 1976, which offered state protection and recovery from natural 
and man-made disasters within the state and broadened the definition 
of disasters to include such events as floods. The DNR prepared a 
floodplain management report in 1977, which presented an overview of 
why floods occur, the problems they create, the range of potential flood 
prevention and damage control measures, and actions taken at all levels 
of government to control floods. After conceding that “we are losing 
the battle of flood control,” the DNR stated the “obvious”: “the 
solution to the flood damage problem lies with the wisdom applied in 
the use of the floodplain.” Flood prevention instead of flood control 
guided the DNR’s response to flooding in the late 1970s. The DNR 
posited that instead of “trying to keep rivers away from man, keep man 
away from the rivers— for floods are natural acts while flood losses 
result from the acts of man, a payment which nature extracts in return 
for occupation of her flood plain.”51
49 Audrey Gunn to William A. Ryan, 13 September 1971, and Special Commission 
on Land Use, “Land Use Programs for Michigan: A Framework for Action,” 14 December 
1971, “Legislature, Special Committees, 1971, Land Use,” Record 82-126, Box 4, Folder 
10, MHC.
i0Acts 1974 PA 116; Public Sector Consultants, Inc., “Land Use and Sustainability,” 
in Michigan in Brief, 2002-03, 7th ed., sponsored by the Michigan Nonprofit Association 
and the Council of Michigan Foundation (Lansing: Public Sector Consultants, Inc.), 
michiganinbrief.org/edition07/Chapter5/LandUse.htm (accessed 30 March 2017).
51 Acts 1976 PA 390; Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Floodplain 
Management, 12, 24-32.
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Solutions proffered to manage flooding problems had failed. The 
DNR’s suggestion for flood prevention appeared sound, as the costs of 
flood damage continued to rise. But their actions could not keep up with 
the demands of modern cities to grow, not only geographically but also 
economically. A destructive flood event would catch residents and 
government officials in a web of conflicting concerns. How could modern 
cities prevent flooding and cosdy damage? Who would decide what flood 
prevention measures to take, and who would pay for those measures? 
Would that action produce the desired results without causing other 
problems? Although dissenting voices warned that urban growth and 
development threatened the health and safety of communities, economic 
concerns drowned out those warnings.
The Economics of Environmentalism
By the 1975 flood, the federal flood-control project for the 
Kalamazoo River, initiated in 1947, remained only a “fond dream” for its 
surviving proponents. The federal government now favored a new 
approach to flood control, one that reflected ideas of an ascendant 
environmental movement. The National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP), authorized in 1968 during President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
administration, changed the direction of federal flood control assistance. 
Instead of structural means, the federal government would subsidize an 
insurance program that required local regulation of floodplain 
development and individual purchase of flood insurance policies.
Initially proposed in the 1950s to control the rising costs of federal 
flood disaster assistance, the NFIP finally passed Congress in 1968 as part 
of a comprehensive Housing and Urban Development Act aimed at 
addressing the nation’s housing crisis. Flooding presented a threat to 
housing and living conditions in urban communities, and the program’s 
proponents believed that a properly designed insurance program would 
help reverse the visible impact of flooding in cities. Michigan’s 
Subdivision Control Act of 1967, Floodplain Control Act of 1968, and 
floodplain control regulations aligned with the nonstructural approach 
endorsed under the NFIP. The aim was to control the economic and 
social costs of flood losses. State officials further included the NFIP in 
the state’s overall program of floodplain management. A state coordinator 
worked with local governments on compliance, providing not only 
education, technical assistance, and oversight for communities, but also
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assistance for lenders, realtors, and insurance agents. The state’s efforts 
retained a commitment to seeking any available federal funding.52
Implementing the NFIP unleashed old ideological objections to the 
program. Opponents from the insurance industry objected to 
government interference; federalists objected to a federally mandated 
program; capitalists called the program socialisdc. Community leaders 
worried about the impact of regulating use of valuable land in floodplains 
and a decreasing urban tax base. Individuals wondered how the household 
budget could absorb the cost of another insurance policy.
Community decisions to participate in the program reflected a 
convoluted mix of both economic and environmental pressures. At 
midcentury, Kalamazooans had decided to abandon the pay-as-you-go 
system in their efforts to address the city’s growing needs. In this new era, 
under the leadership of City Manager Clarence H. Elliott, voters approved 
a 12,870,000 bond issue to help finance the “long-delayed” sewage 
disposal plant. Elected commissioners increased property taxes and 
voters approved another bond issue for a host of other capital 
improvements, including modernizing streets, constructing new pumping 
stations and a water utility building, adding a new bridge over the river, 
acquiring land for a police and municipal court building, and acquiring 
land to expand the airport. In 1955 and 1956, five communities had voted 
in favor of annexation to the city, more than doubling the city’s area and 
increasing the city’s responsibility to provide services. Accommodating 
the acquisitions meant additional expenses for the city, and voters 
approved municipal bonds of $1,970,000 for storm sewers and more than 
$2,000,000 for sanitary sewers (one-quarter of which would be paid for 
by a tax assessment).53
The city’s existence, identity, and growth had relied on its direct 
relationship with its own natural resources and landscape. As the city 
grew, however, that relationship grew less visible to residents and 
policymakers. As late as 1947, almost one thousand acres in the county 
remained devoted to growing celery. By 1960, the industry had practically 
disappeared. Although growers named several causes for this decline, one
52 Michigan Department o f Environmental Quality, “National Flood Insurance 
Program,” michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3684_3725-9380--,00.html (accessed 5 
April 2017).
53 Dunbar, Kalamazoo, 196-204; Massie and Schmitt, Kalamazoo: The Place, 202.
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significant reason pointed to the paper mills’ deep wells, which had drawn 
too much water from the subsoil needed for celery. Following World War 
II, land utilized for celery farms also became valuable real estate to meet 
the booming demands for residential and industrial development.54
Communities negotiated the costs of these changes, both in terms of 
environmental health and economic viability. Despite their intimate 
relationship with the landscape, and their hard-won knowledge that 
manipulation and overuse created flood problems, communities like 
Kalamazoo continued to prioritize economic priorities and hope that 
human ingenuity would, someday, overcome the threat of flooding.
The advent of flood insurance coverage further obscured the 
important issues Kalamazoo still faced. Even the NFIP’s original purpose 
became lost. Before communities and individuals could fully participate in 
the NFIP, some technical and time-consuming steps had to occur. First, 
the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) had to create and issue Flood 
Flazard Boundary Maps (FHBM). Second, if a community agreed to join 
the NFIP after receiving its FHBM, it entered the NFIP’s initial, or 
“emergency,” stage, permitting residents to purchase flood insurance on a 
limited basis. Third, based on the community’s agreement to participate, 
the FIA would conduct a flood insurance study and contract with an 
engineering firm to prepare a more technical Flood Insurance Rate Map 
(FIRM), which permitted the community to enter the NFIP’s “regular” 
program. Lastly, the community' needed to adopt floodplain regulations 
within one year of receiving its FIRM. If the community' did not take this 
final step to participate in the NFIP’s “regular” phase, its citizens could not 
purchase new flood insurance policies, and it could not renew any existing 
flood insurance policies at the end of the stated policy period.55
The case of Kalamazoo demonstrates the long process required to 
implement the NFIP. Kalamazoo received its FHBM on February 15,1974, 
almost six years after the NFIP’s introduction. The following year, the city 
commission adopted a resolution to enter the NFIP’s “emergency” 
component. In order to advance to the “regular” component, a 
consultation meeting occurred in the spring of 1978 to determine existing 
information and additional studies needed. After studying overflows from
54 Dunbar, 130,193-195; Jakle and Wheeler, “Dutch Population in Kalamazoo,” 457; 
Massie and Schmitt, Kalamazoo: The Place, 172.
55 The Institute of Rational Design, Inc., Guidebook fo r  Communities: N ational Flood 
Insurance Program (New York: The Institute of Rational Design, Inc., September 1977), 18; 
J ames R. Quinn, Thirty Years in Deep Water: The N F IP  and Its Strugglefor Significance (Belleville, 
Ontario: Epic Press, 2000), 84-88.
A  Flood o f Problems 105
the Kalamazoo River, Portage Creek, and Arcadia Creek, representatives 
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an engineering 
firm, and the community met to review and approve the results in mid- 
1982. After approval, FEMA issued its report dated November 1984—  
more than ten years after Kalamazoo had received its FHBM.56
With FEMA’s report in hand, city officials faced a six-month deadline 
to adopt floodplain regulations to retain eligibility to participate in the NFIP 
and advance to the “regular” program. The city’s zoning laws adopted in 
1954 had not included floodplain restrictions. City Planner Gary P. 
Niemeck drafted a proposed floodplain management ordinance, which he 
forwarded to city officials for review. As required by local law, public 
notices and hearings provided information and opportunities for comment. 
The city’s Office of Economic Development and Planning recommended 
adoption of the proposed ordinance, with a warning that failure to adopt 
the regulations would render floodplain property owners ineligible for 
mortgages, loans, grants, or any other funding directly or indirectly 
connected with a federal agency. The executive director of the Kalamazoo 
Downtown Development Authority (DDA) wrote to Mayor Francis P. 
Hamilton and the city commissioners on March 12,1985, urging adoption 
of the proposed floodplain regulations to ensure protection of the 
“financial health of property owners in the floodplain” and avoid loss of 
“future funding” for “needed improvements in the floodplains.” Although 
noting the added burden on developers and real estate investors of “yet 
another layer of construction regulations,” the DDA believed the city had 
“little choice but to adopt the regulations.”57 Following a public hearing on 
March 18, the commissioners adopted the ordinance, adding a chapter to 
the city’s zoning law. The new law included a cautionary section: its 
provisions, based on scientific and engineering recommendations, offered 
a reasonable degree of regulatory flood protection; its provisions did not 
imply that larger floods or floods outside the identified hazard areas would 
not occur; and its provisions did not create any city liability for flood
56 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Flood Insurance Study: City of Kalamazoo, 
Kalamazoo County, Michigan (November 1984), 2-4, 10.
57 Gary P. Niemeck to Sheryl L. Sculley, January 21,1985, memorandum, Kalamazoo 
City Attorney’s Office, Freedom of Information Act Coordinator (KCAO); Gary P. 
Niemeck to City Planning Commission, January' 15,1985, memorandum, KCAO; Gary' P. 
Niemeck to City Commission, February' 13, 1985, KCAO; James A. Visser to Francis P. 
Hamilton and Members of the City Commission, March 12, 1985, KCAO.
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damages resulting from reliance on the regulations. Thus, Kalamazoo 
entered the NFIP regular program on May 1 ,1985.58
With the complicated process behind them, Kalamazooans 
presumably could rest assured that they had taken the necessary 
precautions against flood damages. Yet participating in the NFIP did not 
prevent flooding or flood damages. A 1988-1989 U.S. Geological Survey 
summary of flooding stated that “the most extensive and damaging flood 
of record” occurred in the central Lower Peninsula in September 1986, 
causing approximately $500 million in damages. Although stating that 
major flooding in Michigan was not frequent, the USGS report quoted an 
average annual flood damage amount of $60 million-$100 million.59 
Furthermore, enforcing floodplain regulations remained a community 
mandate and purchasing flood insurance policies remained an individual 
responsibility—an individual choice which has proved unpopular, as only 
a fraction of insurable structures are covered by flood insurance.60
C onclusion
Riverine cities and towns across Michigan had a history of 
problematic flooding. Flooding represented a risk that could occur at any 
time under the right conditions, but because of its unpredictability and 
irregularity, the threat was often forgotten in favor of more immediate or 
desirable economic concerns. As demonstrated with the case of 
Kalamazoo, settlement and growth placed residents and businesses in an 
unhealthy and dangerous position when the river flooded. Despite 
awareness of the river’s propensity to flood and the inadvisability of 
developing floodplains, urban residents approached their flood problems 
with hopes that management and expertise, with sufficient funding, could 
overcome nature. Government officials working with engineering and 
scientific experts also believed that some combination of management, 
manipulation, and methodology would provide future solutions. 
Continued growth led to destructive flooding. But it was also persistent
58 City of Kalamazoo Ordinance Nos. 439 and 1345.
59 US Geological Survey, “Michigan D roughts and Floods,” in Water-Supply
Paper 2375, National Water Summary 1988-89— Floods and Droughts,
http://md.water.usgs.gov/publications/wsp-2375/mi/index.html (accessed 15 March 2017).
60 Federal Emergenq- Management Agency, “Community Status Book Report: Michigan,” 
fem a.gov/cis/M I.pdf (accessed 15 March 2017); Michigan D epartm ent o f 
Environmental Quality', “Floodplain Management/Nadonal Flood Insurance,” 
michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3684_3725—,00.html (accessed 4 April 2017); 
Michigan Department o f Environmental Quality, “National Flood Insurance Program,” 
michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3313_3684_3725-9380-,00.html (accessed 31 January 
2018).
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attitudes about private property rights and the pursuit of economic 
“progress” that, despite a working knowledge of floodplain risks and also 
the rise of environmentalism even at local levels, ultimately overrode 
concerns for community and landscape protection.
The NFIP represented an environmentally conscious management 
technique that also offered economic benefits. By following state and 
federal governments’ approved path toward flood prevention, 
communities gained eligibility for their residents to receive federally 
subsidized flood insurance, federally backed mortgages, and eligibility 
for federal funds in the event of a major disaster. Yet the modern and 
enlightened management approach did not successfully curb ongoing 
urban growth, meaning that the best flood insurance coverage could do 
was to offset the costs of flood damage.
By way of an epilogue, the city of Kalamazoo and Kalamazoo County 
have recently experienced more destructive flooding that threatened 
community viability. The 2018 spring rains caused a “historic crest” of 
the Kalamazoo River and $2.5 million in damages. Affected businesses 
and homeowners learned that, unfortunately, this flood was far less 
damaging than the last major event in 2008, and this time, the county did 
not qualify for federal funds under a state of emergency.61 These events 
are as distressing for today’s residents as historical floods were to earlier 
citizens. But they should not be a surprise. Economics, politics, and 
cultural attitudes curtailed the effectiveness of past approaches, while 
facilitating floodplain encroachments that remain in place today. 
Likewise, Kalamazoo’s flood history reveals past limitations of 
environmentalist approaches to urban landscapes. Hopes that floodplain 
regulations would result in a changed philosophy and “keep [people] away 
from the rivers” were as much wishful thinking as the hope that continued 
growth would not interfere with the success of expensive flood control 
efforts. And yet, humans must hold onto hope. Indeed, research into and 
experiments with new “soft landscape armor” floodplain restoration 
methods, combined with local sustainability initiatives and flood warning 
systems, may lead toward more workable solutions to protect urban 
floodplains and urban dwellers. While history cannot be undone, it can 
inform the path toward the future.
61 “$2.5M in Damage Caused by Kalamazoo Record-Breaking Floods,” 
MLive, 9 March 2018, mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2018/03/
flood_victims_form_coalition_t.html (accessed 9 November 2018).
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